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ABSTRACT This article provides an introduction to science advisory structures in elected
legislatures; an arena of public decision-making which, although critical to the healthy
functioning of democratic societies, has been largely neglected in recent discussions of
science advice. The article begins by contrasting the functions and operating environments of
legislatures with those of executive branches of governments, examining how these differ-
ences shape the requirements of their respective science advisory structures. A study of
three national legislative science advice units within Europe is then presented, revealing a
range of advisory structures and practices. These variations in approach suggest different
underpinning conceptions about both why science advice is being provided, and how science
advice can most effectively inﬂuence a legislature’s activities. Given these differences, and
our currently limited comparative understanding of the inﬂuence of scientiﬁc knowledge
across different spheres of public decision-making, we argue that more attention needs to be
focused on the difﬁcult challenge of mapping and understanding legislative science advisory
structures via a comparative international study. We close by arguing that an international
comparative exercise of this type could signiﬁcantly improve our understanding of the dif-
ferent inﬂuences science advisory practices and structures can have on the function of our
democratic societies’ deliberative bodies. This article is published as part of a collection on
scientiﬁc advice to governments.
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Introduction
The importance of science advice—broadly deﬁned here aspractices for mobilizing scientiﬁc knowledge in support ofpublic decision-making—is now widely accepted (OECD,
2015). Over the last decade, governance organizations at all scales,
local through international, have increased their commitment to
informing policy decisions with the best available scientiﬁc
knowledge. This has in turn generated a steady expansion in the
number and types of established science advisory structures.
Throughout this period, our understanding of science advice
has also steadily improved, particularly in the context of the
executive branches of governments (see for example Doubleday
and Wilsdon, 2013; Spruijt et al., 2014; Wilsdon et al., 2014).
However, while much is known about the use and inﬂuence of
scientiﬁc evidence in some well-studied institutional and topical
contexts (see for example Hofer et al., 2015), there remain some
important gaps. One arena of public decision-making critical to
the functioning of healthy democracies that has been largely
overlooked in the recent expansion and study of science advice is
that of legislatures (Tyler, 2013; Spruijt et al., 2014).
As social institutions charged with representing the collective
will of their society, legislatures—and the elected members
comprising them—carry unique responsibilities. Most impor-
tantly, legislatures exist to reconcile the diverse, often conﬂicting,
interests and expectations of a society’s constituent groups and
communities through the democratic means of peaceful dialogue
and compromise. While the detailed practices vary, legislatures
fulﬁl these responsibilities through the performance of three
general functions: public deliberation over any and all matters of
societal concern [debate]; the creation of legal and budgetary
frameworks that guide how those matters should be addressed
[legislation]; and oversight of programmes enacted by the
executive branches of government to address those matters
[scrutiny]. Elected members also respond to informational
requests from constituents and provide frequent public state-
ments and comments, which serve the additional function of
shaping public understanding of the diverse range of issues with
which they engage [public engagement]. To effectively perform
these functions and fulﬁl their responsibilities in the modern era,
elected members would ideally be supported by effective science
advisory systems (Lake, 1995; Guston, 2004).
The importance of understanding the inﬂuence of science
advice on legislatures is increasingly recognized, both in the
literature (for example, Padilla and Gibson, 2000; Nath, 2011;
Tyler, 2013) and by policy institutions funding networks and
capacity building projects on legislative science advice (for
example, the international project on Building Capacity in the
Use of Research Evidence funded by the UK Department for
International Development). Those engaged in providing science
advice to legislatures would beneﬁt from knowing whether, and to
what extent, they are inﬂuencing their respective audiences; and
those establishing new or modifying existing science advisory
institutions, whether legislative or otherwise, could learn from
approaches tried and tested elsewhere (Glynn et al., 2003;
Doubleday and Wilsdon, 2013; Wilsdon et al., 2014). At present,
however, we have insufﬁcient knowledge about how existing
legislative science advisory structures currently conceive of and
work to enact their inﬂuence upon their legislature’s functions
and responsibilities.
This article presents the argument that legislative science
advice deserves more comprehensive and internationally com-
parative attention. This argument is developed ﬁrst by articulat-
ing the different contexts of science advice in legislative versus
executive environments (Section “science advice in legislatures
versus executives”). The current landscape of legislative science
advice institutions in Europe is then outlined (Section “science
advisory units in European legislatures”), followed by the results
of an initial comparative study examining three existing science
advisory units within national legislative environments in the EU
(Section “case study of three European science advisory units”;
the methods for this study are described in section). The main
purpose of this study was to explore differences between these
units, both in terms of structures and practices, and in terms of
their intended impact on their legislatures and/or their broader
societies. Our ﬁndings reveal a richer landscape of practices and
conceptions of impact for legislative science advice than generally
discussed in the literature, suggesting that more comprehensive
studies are needed to map the many inﬂuences science advice can
have on legislatures’ activities. These components are integrated
in the ﬁnal Discussion and Conclusions (Section “Discussion and
Conclusions”), wherein we discuss the opportunities of and
challenges facing a comprehensive, internationally comparative
research agenda, which we argue could signiﬁcantly advance our
understanding and practice of science advice.
Science advice in legislatures versus executives
Before discussing the analysis of speciﬁc legislative science
advisory units, the substantially different context of science
advice in legislative versus executive branches must be appre-
ciated (Tyler, 2013; OECD, 2015). Legislators have different needs
for science advice than decision-makers in the executive, and the
structures of these systems mean that the ways in which science
advice is organized institutionally, as well as the type of advice
provided, differs to that in the executive. Using the example of the
UK executive and legislature (Parliament), the following describes
the major differences between these structures and the institu-
tional sources of science advice that support them.
The UK executive and its institutional sources of science
advice. The UK executive is made up of (at the time of writing)
120 ministers (of whom, 27 are from the House of Lords, the rest
are from the House of Commons) plus 29 whips (across both
Houses). These politicians are all aligned to a single political
vision: they are, usually, from the same political party, signed up
to the same manifesto, and report, ultimately, to the Prime
Minister. A large civil service, made up of a little over 400,000
staff, supports them. An organization of such size requires a clear
hierarchy with well-deﬁned lines of communication, and the UK
civil service has both.
Institutional scientiﬁc advice in this context has certain
characteristics. First, it must ﬁt into the extensive structure of
the civil service, slotting into the hierarchy where it can make a
difference. Several hundred-science advisers across the executive
provide information and analysis to (mostly) other civil servants
and (sometimes) ministers. They operate in policy teams within
departments, on cross-departmental advisory groups, in executive
agencies, and in independent advisory committees, in all cases
reporting to speciﬁc posts within the executive structure. Second,
it is provided within an environment shaped by the political
agendas of the ministers running the executive. In that sense, even
when not explicitly framed as evaluating speciﬁc policy proposals,
advice is provided in a context shaped by understood political
agendas, and is frequently interpreted as either supporting or
challenging given policy alternatives. Although science advice in
executives has sometimes been idealized using a simplistic
caricature of Pielke’s (2003) “honest broker” model—that is,
assuming that “independent advice” also means complete
disinterest towards the various policy options—this kind of
romanticized, value-free conception of science advice seldom
turns out to reﬂect reality (Douglas, 2009). Rather, science advice
ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2017.30
2 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3:17030 |DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2017.30 |www.palgrave-journals.com/palcomms
in executives is frequently, and necessarily, directive in nature
(House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, 2012;
Simon, 2014).
The UK legislature and its institutional sources of science
advice. Legislatures differ starkly from this characterization of
science advice. The UK Parliament is made up of 650 Members of
the House of Commons (MPs) and more than 800 Members of
the House of Lords (Peers). The former is elected, with each
Member representing a constituency and a political party. The
latter is appointed, with over 80% of Members representing a
political party, and the rest being independent “cross benchers”
who are selected from a wide range of professions, including
academia, medicine and engineering. Across both Houses, there
are well over a thousand active politicians with an extremely wide
range of interests, expertise and politics. They represent con-
stituencies from the north of Scotland to the south of England,
every conceivable interest group and a spectrum of politics that
ranges from “right wing” (conservative) to “left wing” (socialist).
A relatively small staff of impartial ofﬁcials, numbering only a
few thousand, supports the whole system. Compared with the
executive, Parliament has an order of magnitude more politicians
and two orders of magnitude fewer staff. Full time science
advisers in the UK Parliament sit in the House of Commons and
House of Lords Libraries1 (both provide research services),
several of the select committees of both Houses, and in the
Parliamentary Ofﬁce of Science and Technology (POST), which is
an ofﬁce of both Houses. Most select committees also appoint
external specialist advisers, usually academics, either to individual
inquiries or sometimes for longer, part-time, ad hoc contracts.
In contrast to the UK executive, Parliament has a relatively
loose and changeable hierarchy, and focuses less on making
policy, and more on debate and scrutiny. This means that science
advice has a wide range of possible targets, which affects the way
that advice is presented, and is used both as a supporting tool for
making arguments (in debate) and for asking forensic questions
(in scrutiny), which affects the type of advice required. Thus, in
Parliament, science advice is usually presented in a fashion that
enables its use by multiple parties, from MPs’ staffers preparing
their bosses for debate, to committees of MPs asking searching
questions of government ministers. Critically, the same scientiﬁc
advice in a legislative environment will frequently be used by two
or more members (or their staff) seeking to advance profoundly
different political agendas, based on widely varying underlying
values. In this context, the advice given has to be sensitive to these
different views, while representing the evidence impartially. In
contrast to much of executive science advice, UK parliamentary
science advice is discursive in nature. Such advice is not a broker
of a narrow range of policy options, but of evidential value to a
wide range of policy options.
The differences between science advice in executive and
legislative environments are essential to understand that, from a
practical perspective, structures and modes developed for one
environment do not necessarily translate easily to the other.
However, developing a better understanding of how science
advice plays out across these different environments provides a
valuable opportunity for both identifying general principles and
practices, and for diversifying our understanding of the various
routes and structures through which scientiﬁc knowledge can be,
and currently is being, mobilized in support of public decision-
making.
Science advisory units in European Legislatures
To date, the most signiﬁcant body of literature on institutional
structures for science advice to legislatures comes from the
United States and is focused on the former Congressional Ofﬁce
of Technology Assessment (OTA), which closed on 29 September
1995 (Gibbons and Gwin, 1985; Bimber, 1996; Jones et al., 1996;
Bimber and Guston, 1997; Guston et al., 1997; Morgan and Peha,
2003). The OTA pioneered a particular mode of science advice,
referred to as Technology Assessment (TA), which sought to
advise legislators on the ethical and legal aspects of new sciences
and technologies and possible social, economic and environ-
mental impacts. This informed the development of a number of
similar units across Europe in the 1980s and 1990s that set out to
emulate the expert analysis provided by the OTA, alongside a
focus on the involvement of stakeholders and the wider public in
TA processes (Hennen and Nierling, 2015a: 12). The establish-
ment of institutional TA units in Europe is often referred to as a
“second wave of TA” in recognition both of the inﬂuence of the
OTA (Rip, 2012), and of the different organizational, methodo-
logical and mission of European TA units (Vig and Paschen,
2000; Hennen and Ladikas, 2009; Enzing et al., 2012; Hennen and
Nierling, 2015a). These units now represent the considerable
majority of institutional science advisory structures for European
legislatures.
Awareness and understanding of European TA units and the
important science advisory functions they serve have increased in
large part thanks to international networking and research
projects, such as the EU-funded Parliaments and Civil Society
in Technology Assessment (PACITA) and the European
Parliamentary Technology Assessment (EPTA) network. These
have furthered understanding of the different ways that these
units are structured across Europe, as well as how different factors
shape their varying design and operation (Lentsch and Weingart,
2011; Bütschi, 2012; European Parliamentary Technology
Assessment, 2012; Bütschi and Almeida, 2015; Hennen and
Nierling, 2015a,b). Moreover, the “intense networking and
mutual learning processes” within the EPTA Network has led
to a collective learning about methodologies and ideas and “a
widening ﬁeld for mutual exploration and collaboration”
(Hennen and Nierling, 2015a: 9).
These networks and literature on European TA units provides
an excellent foundation for exploring one of the most
institutionalised forms of science advice in legislative environ-
ments. However, there remain at least two important gaps
surrounding the challenging but critical question of how (and
how effectively) these units inﬂuence legislative and/or broader
societal outcomes.
First, empirical studies of such inﬂuence are limited, and
typically focus on the broad question of whether such bodies are
“fulﬁlling their mission to explore the possible impact of
technology on society in order to support decision-making or
not” (Hennen et al., 2004: 57). However, this generic framing
assumes that all such science advisory institutions have (or should
have) the same concept of what this broad mission means; an
assumption that is not borne out by our examination of three TA
institutions in Europe, as demonstrated in the next section
(Section “Case study of three European science advisory units”).
Second, studies on inﬂuence have to date typically examined
the impact of these units independently of any consideration of
the importance of other sources of science advice. Inﬂuence is
frequently seen in terms of speciﬁc mechanistic outcomes,
without consideration to mapping or understanding the diverse
routes through which science advice can reach legislators and
inﬂuence legislative activities. Examples such as the approval of
mitochondrial donation in the UK legislature—a case outlined in
the Supporting Information for this article—demonstrate the
difﬁculties of identifying the impact of institutional bodies on
legislatures. Despite being held up as an example of science advice
informing legislative scrutiny in the UK context (Blackwood,
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2015; Gallagher, 2015), a closer examination of this case reveals
the role of multiple actors and therefore, the competition that
institutional sources of science advice face from other evidential
sources, both internal and external to the legislature. While the
details will vary in different countries, the existence of a range of
mechanisms, formal and informal, for diverse societal actors to
provide advice and evidence to legislators is foundational to
modern democratic legislative environments. While beyond the
scope of this study, we would expect detailed examination of cases
from other legislatures with formal science advisory units (for
example, those within the EPTA community) would reveal
similar patterns. We return to the challenges of mapping and
understanding the impact of science advice within such a diverse
ecosystem in our Discussions and Conclusions (Section “Discus-
sion and Conclusions”).
Case study of three European science advisory units
The analysis presented in this section is based on a small study of
three science advisory units for national legislatures in Europe.
This involved a nine-month secondment of one author (CLW) to
the UK POST, along with exploratory visits by that author to two
further legislative science advisory units in Europe—OPECST in
France, and TA-Swiss in Switzerland. Semi-structured interviews
were undertaken with representatives of the ofﬁces in order to
assist with interpreting and navigating public domain materials,
and a comparative analysis of these three bodies was undertaken
using these materials. (All authors contributed insights to the
comparative analysis.) The objective was to identify similarities
and differences in the structure and function of these units, and
the potential implications for the units’ inﬂuence on legislative
functions.
Table 1 compares critical points in the output generation
process for the three examined science advisory units. The ﬁrst
row presents a summary of the “impact” statements provided in a
2012 report produced by EPTA to provide, in one location and in
the same format, basic institutional and procedural information
about all its member institutions (EPTA, 2012). This table then
looks at four parameters to highlight similarities and differences
between the approaches taken to: physical and administrative
location of the ofﬁce; method for generating TA questions; the
nature of the unit’s outputs; and the means by which these
outputs are produced. These parameters illustrate, even within
this limited sample, distinct combinations of approaches to the
production of science advice. It is argued below that these
approaches both contribute to, and are derived from, the different
units’ perspectives on what type of inﬂuence is important, and
how each speciﬁc conception of inﬂuence is most effectively
mobilized. This work forms a set of initial observations and
hypotheses that warrant further investigation.
From the information collated in Table 1, it can be seen
that the science advisory units examined take a spectrum of
approaches across each parameter discussed. The impact
statements included highlight the differently stated organizational
perspectives with respect to impact. This illustrates the sometimes
overlapping and other times differing perspectives on the nature
and measurement of impact, from quantiﬁcation of use by
parliamentarians to visibility in the media. Question generation
ranges from reactive (based upon an actual or perceived
imminently pressing need from stakeholder communities) and
fully determined by MPs (OPECST) to proactive and determined
by the unit’s staff (overseen by a board or committee) (POST and
TA-Swiss). Outputs regularly include a long-form written version
of the information collated, but the nature and content of these
reports differs from a technical manual (TA-Swiss) to a summary
of policy and public debates (OPECST). Summary reports and
public events are also a common output, though vary in their
immediate audiences, aims and format. Similarly, generation of
outputs can occur at many different levels of TA body
involvement in collation, production and editing: from entirely
within the unit’s team (POST) to externally tendered bodies of
experts organized for the purpose (TA-Swiss).
A brief analysis of the above suggests that in considering the
self-reported effectiveness and impact of legislative science
advisory units, ﬁve key considerations are: target audience;
institutional location; scope of the unit’s role in relation to the
legislature; methods used by the organization to generate study
questions and produce outputs; and the involvement of legislators
in the work of the unit. It also invites further reﬂection on the
nature and expectations of the likely target audience(s) in shaping
the impact agenda of these bodies.
Target audience. The intended audience for outputs is correlated
with both the methods and outputs of the units examined. While
all of the outputs of the bodies noted above are a product of the
related TA-based processes, their primary readership differs
vastly, which is reﬂected in the considerably different format of
their outputs in Table 1. TA-Swiss long reports are likely to be
read by students and technical specialists, while their short
reports are designed for the general public as well as legislators.
All of POST’s outputs are designed primarily for decision makers,
as are those of OPECST. Some elements of the outputs conform
to the idea that legislative science advice is usually presented in a
fashion that enables its use by multiple parties, particularly the
content, language and presentation style of short brieﬁng and
summary reports.
Institutional location. The location of POST and OPECST
within the UK and French legislatures, respectively implies more
direct access to, and therefore inﬂuence upon, legislators them-
selves. The evolution of POST from an organization outside of the
UK legislature, funded by external sponsorship, to an internal
body within it demonstrates the philosophy behind this point.
According to Professor Michael Norton, POST’s ﬁrst director, the
experience of starting POST outside of Parliament, then migrat-
ing inside, reinforced the value of being close to POST’s targeted
legislative customers (Norton, 1997). Being located within the UK
legislature enables POST to demonstrate its expertise and advice
on scientiﬁc and technological matters as a valuable and distinct
addition to the support provided by other internal science advi-
sory structures, such as the Science and Environment Section
within the House of Commons Library (House of Commons,
1995; Norton, 1997: 229). The assumption that closer proximity
between science advisory structures and legislators facilitates the
transmission of advice through formal as well as informal chan-
nels is echoed in the literature (Cruz-Castro and Sanz-Menédez,
2004; European Parliamentary Research Service, 2015; van Est
et al., 2015). However, it is not accepted universally. Some
authors argue that independent science advisory organizations
such as TA-Swiss have the most visible effects in term of “raising
knowledge” and “forming attitudes/opinions” (Enzing et al.,
2012: 20).
Scope of work. It is important to consider the scope of these units
in relation to the legislature and, speciﬁcally, whether they
function purely as an information service or one that has the
capacity, or indeed expectations, to put forward policy options or
make recommendations. Hennen (2000) argues that such science
advisory units should not be assessed according to their impact
on political decision-making as they were not designed to inﬂu-
ence such decision-making directly. Rather, they are “designed
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Table 1 | Comparison of three TA organizations in Europe*
UK (POST) France (OPECST) Switzerland (TA-Swiss)
Impact “Impact is difﬁcult to assess due to the
logistical and administrative obstacles…
POST is one of many organizations
delivering commentary on scientiﬁc
issues”. Qualitative and quantitative data
indicates that POST is a valued
organization. “POSTnotes are particularly
valued for their impartiality”. 2009 survey
data indicated that “over 80% of
parliamentarians (out of a sample of 50)
had used POSTnotes more than once in the
past year.” “POSTnotes are known to have
considerable impact outside Parliament
[and] usually account for around a third of
all downloads from the Parliamentary
website”. POST also has over 7,500
followers on Twitter, and a newsletter
which has over 3,500 subscribers.
OPECST has progressively “become an
acknowledged instrument of
parliamentary action. Several laws make
provision either for it to be informed of, or
to participate in the appointment of
representatives of Parliament to various
bodies, or for its representation, by its
President or one of its members, on the
board of directors of various
organisations.” It contributes to the
development of international
parliamentary relations (particularly via
EPTA). OPECST has become a special
interlocutor for the scientiﬁc community
and maintains close links with it. Its events
and conferences bring together OPECST
and high-level scientiﬁc organizations. “In
the near future, OPECST would like to
continue to strengthen its missions and, in
particular, to play a role in furthering the
exchange between the political and
scientiﬁc worlds.”
“Political decision makers rely on
assessments which show the
consequences and social impact of
technologies. The work of TA-SWISS is
widely recognized for its quality and the
impartiality of its assessments. It is vital
for TA-SWISS to continually strive for
these qualities in order to maintain
support from all political parties”. TA-
Swiss—reports are often cited in
committee reports and in chamber
debates but can also be used in other
forums such as the government, local
authorities etc. Most of the committee
seminars are webcast and broadcast on
television.
Institutional
Location
Internal.
Ofﬁce based within parliamentary ofﬁces
and located on the parliamentary estate.
Internal.
Ofﬁce based within parliamentary ofﬁces
and located on the parliamentary estate.
External.
Ofﬁce is a Centre of Competence of the
Swiss Academies of Arts and Science
located away from the parliamentary
estate.
Generation of
questions
Proactive and reactive.
Topics are selected through horizon
scanning by the POST team and requests
from MPs and/or parliamentary staff.
Questions are co-produced by POST team
and POST Board (comprising 14
parliamentarians from the House of
Commons [10] and Lords [4]; external
science and technology specialists [4]; ex-
ofﬁcio representatives from the House of
Commons and Lords).
Reactive.
All topics are determined and proposed by
MPs (matters can be referred to OPECST
at the request of a chair of a political
group, a request of 60 deputies or 40
senators, or a request of a special or
permanent commission).
Proactive and reactive.
Horizon scanning by TA-Swiss team, with
selection overseen by executive
committee (around 15 members with
different professional competences and
institutional backgrounds).
Outputs Format: Format: Format:
 Written brieﬁngs—mostly four-page
summary briefs (POSTnotes)
 Events—smaller events held for MPs and
Peers (often linked to POSTnote
publication topics), occasional larger
events and exhibitions
 Oral brieﬁngs—to MPs and Peers and/or
parliamentary staff by request
 Legislative reports—recording MPs
views on the technical content of the
TA question (supported by
scientiﬁc input)
 Summary reports—four-page summary
versions of legislative reports
 Public hearings—gathering the views of
leading ﬁgures and organizations
(outputs may be annexed to legislative
report)
 Symposiums and conferences—larger
policy / public meetings
 Technical reports—large books which
collate detailed, contemporary
technical knowledge on the topic
 Summary reports—which summarize
the key technical and policy-relevant
content of reports
 Public presentations—workshops and
debates to encourage participation
Generation of
outputs
Internal topical expertise from POST team
sections (social sciences, energy and
environment, physical sciences and ICT,
and biological sciences and health), review
of existing evidence base and interviews
with relevant experts across academia,
industry, government, NGO, civil society
and so on. Outputs are peer reviewed by
external experts before publication.
Guidance from OPECST team in assisting
a nominated parliamentary rapporteur to
undertake the process of creating a record
of conversations between MPs on the
topic, based on preliminary technical
content. Organization of public hearings
may also be part of this process. Report
generation is overseen by rapporteurs and
a scientiﬁc standing committee.
Tendering for expertise to external,
topical scientiﬁc research groups (self-
formed 10–20 persons with appropriate
professional competences). All
assessments are project managed by a
member of the TA-Swiss team, guided by
the executive committee (mixed
expertise) and a monitoring group
(technical expertise) formed for the
purpose
*Information in Table 1 is adapted from EPTA 2012. Impact statements are summarized for brevity, with quotation marks illustrating direct quotation from the reference material.
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to... prepare knowledge that is relevant for decision making …
[in] an attempt to include the knowledge and perspectives of
social groups normally not involved in technology policy decision
making in order to expand the scope of perspectives considered in
technology policy” (Hennen, 2000: 152). However, examining the
different functions and operations of these units in Europe sug-
gests that what is considered within the remit of “preparing
knowledge for decision-making” varies between organizations.
Outputs (usually in the form of reports) produced by TA-Swiss
can include recommendations (Attila et al., 2012: 148; Feresin
et al., 2012: 164–165; Nentwich et al., 2012: 32, 42; Paldam Folker
et al., 2012: 69). This can be contrasted with POST in the United
Kingdom, which does not make policy recommendations, seeing
this as a key factor in maintaining its demonstrable impartiality.
The variations in the approaches adopted by these units to pro-
viding science advice suggest different underpinning models
about both why such advice is being provided, and how it can
inﬂuence legislatures’ activities.
Methods for generating study questions and outputs. The use
of methods that increase the legitimacy and visibility of science
advisory organizations are valued because they maximize the
perceived independence of outputs (Nowotny et al., 2001). The
generation of study questions can be overseen by a board or
executive committee, as is the case with POST and TA-Swiss,
providing oversight and transparency, with OPECST topics
selected directly by MPs. The processes for generating outputs
range from the external appointment of a speciﬁc technical
research group (TA-Swiss), to conducting literature reviews and
research interviews across a range of stakeholders (POST), and
includes the broader participatory methods used by both
OPECST and TA-Swiss. Focusing on informing public debate
through participatory methods is a mechanism used by some
legislative science advisory units to feed into parliamentary
decision-taking processes (Schot and Rip, 1997; Genus, 2006: 15–
16; Delvenne et al., 2011: 41). Units that engage with the media as
part of a broader mission to stimulate public debate have been
found to be particularly effective at raising the interest of legis-
lators and communicating their results to the general public (Salo
and Kuusi, 2001: 457; Enzing et al., 2012: 20), and many have
stated interest and capacity for doing so.
Involvement of legislators. The degree of involvement of legis-
lators in the functioning of different science advisory units sug-
gests particular understandings about impact. Legislators are
actively involved on a permanent basis in OPECST in France
(Enzing et al., 2012: 12). Involving legislators in the unit’s prac-
tices—whether through the selection of topics, or in the OPECST
case, in the development, production and communication of
outputs—is seen to be an important mechanism for impact
(Enzing et al., 2012: 18; van Est et al., 2015). However, this is not
always straightforward. While the committed involvement of
legislators is “desirable, if not indispensable”, the impartiality and
methodological robustness of science advisory institutions may be
questioned if such bodies are perceived to be too close to legis-
lators (Salo and Kuusi, 2001: 460). POST and TA-Swiss are lar-
gely distanced from legislative involvement in the production
of outputs, and to some extent in the generation of research
questions.
These three examples of legislative science advisory units
within Europe show considerable variation in the potential
objectives, operational models and speciﬁc practices. The above
analysis shows these variations to be closely correlated with
different ideas of how science advice can most effectively
inﬂuence legislative decision-making. Differences include both
the type of inﬂuence and audiences that are prioritized, and the
mechanisms through which these units seek to achieve and
monitor their inﬂuence.
A detailed historical analysis of the origins of these three units’
perspectives on impact was beyond the scope of this study. Some
aspects will have derived from explicit aims at the inception of the
units, while others will have evolved in parallel with the changing
practices and structures of the units. Regardless, this initial
comparative study clearly demonstrates that contemporary
legislative science advisory units have notably different concep-
tions of desired inﬂuence (or mission) on their respective
legislative bodies.
This variety in science advisory objectives, and the different
routes identiﬁed through which a science advice unit can
accomplish those different objectives, is also different from, and
broader than, those typically discussed in contemporary science
advice literature focused on the executive branches of govern-
ment. On the basis of these initial results, we argue that more
comprehensive studies are needed to identify and understand the
variety of inﬂuences that science advice can have on legislative
responsibilities and functions. Ideally, such studies would also
aim to evaluate how effective different structures and practices of
formal science advisory units are at delivering different concep-
tions of impact.
Discussion and conclusions
Improving the supply and demand of science advice is now an
international concern. In this context, “[pooling] our efforts…
and [learning] from each other” by sharing insights and best
practices across different advisory systems is essential (Wilsdon
et al., 2014). The study presented in this paper aims to contribute
to this collective learning process by documenting and analysing
the current structures and practices of legislative science advice—
a domain of public decision-making currently underrepresented
in the current science advice literature.
The ﬁrst important observation is the notably different
requirements for science advice that exist in legislative contexts
relative to those within executive environments (Section “Science
advice in legislatures versus executives”). Executive science advice
must operate within extensive civil service bureaucracies; is
provided in an environment shaped by focused, delivery-oriented
political agendas stemming from Ministers; and must frequently
provide directive analysis of and advice on speciﬁc policy
alternatives. Conversely, legislative science supports the broader
deliberative processes of legislation, debate and scrutiny; needs to
be provided in a manner that enables adoption and use by diverse
users with divergent political agendas; and must provide an
evidence base that is relevant to, but generally not directive about,
a wide range of policy alternatives. Understanding these
differences is critical for designing effective structures and
practices for science advice within diverse public decision-
making contexts. This emphasizes the need for expanding
research into legislative science advice to parallel currently
expanding exploration of executive science advice.
Of course, as is true for executive science advice, legislative
science advisory units do not all approach the delivery of their
core objective to support public decision-making in the same way.
In fact, our initial comparison of only three legislative science
advisory units in Europe (Sections “Science advisory units in
European legislatures” and “Case study of three European science
advisory units”) demonstrated considerable diversity in their
conceptions of impact, inﬂuence and mission of these units, and
in how those in turn translated into institutional practices. This
diversity in objectives, and the variety of routes identiﬁed through
which a science advisory unit can accomplish those different
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objectives, appears to be broader than the range typically
discussed in the current literature focused on executive science
advice. For example, the participatory methods undertaken by
OPECST and TA-Swiss that engage the public and media as a
route to inﬂuencing legislative decision-makers is not generally
seen in executive environments. Given the political agendas
shaping the context of executive science advice discussed earlier,
this is perhaps not surprising; direct appeal to the public in such
executive contexts could be seen as undermining the authority of
the politically-mandated executive ofﬁcials.2 In the context of
legislative environments, however, such direct engagement of
public stakeholders does not seem—at least in two of the contexts
examined in this study—to engender such tensions. Rather, there
is evidence from other studies that such routes enhance legislative
engagement and uptake of science advice (Salo and Kuusi, 2001:
457; Enzing et al., 2012: 20). The examination of legislative advice
thus opens up new and important conversations regarding the
interface between science advice, generally framed as for
speciﬁcally identiﬁable communities of decision makers, and
public debates and deliberations within our increasingly educated
and discursive democratic societies.
With well over a dozen legislative science advice units in
Europe alone, and new units being established or considered
around the world, this is a rich, largely unexplored domain of
potential data for the growing community of scholars, researchers
and practitioners examining and evolving contemporary science
advisory systems. A more in depth comparison of the legislative
science advisory units of a larger number of countries would very
likely provide deeper and broader new insights into different
possible models for the structures and practices of science advice.
That said, mapping and analysing the diverse inﬂuences of
science advice on the activities of a national legislature is a
complex undertaking. Even if the goal is simply to evaluate the
inﬂuence of a single institutional source, such as a national
legislative science advice unit, the results of the last section
highlight the challenge of ﬁrst needing to understand the impact
objective(s), and the practices being deployed to accomplish that
objective. Moreover, as discussed in the section “Science advisory
units in European legislatures” and highlighted by the case study
presented in the supporting information, advice about the
scientiﬁc dimensions of legislative activities comes from a range
of sources, not just institutionalised science advisory bodies. To
develop a comprehensive understanding of how scientiﬁc
knowledge is effectively mobilized to support legislative respon-
sibilities and functions, research examining legislative science
advice needs to consider the full range of actors involved in
providing scientiﬁc advice into legislative activities.
The main challenge for any such comparative study would be
in evaluating how effective the different science advice models are
at actually supporting and inﬂuencing legislative functions
(Hennen, 2000; Bütschi et al., 2004; Cruz-Castro and Sanz-
Menédez, 2004; Hennen et al., 2004; Hennen, 2012). As discussed
in the section “Case study of three European science advisory
units”, conceptions of who to inﬂuence and how to deliver that
inﬂuence vary between the three units we examined, adding to the
complexity of evaluating and comparing the effectiveness of
different units. To be effective, an internationally comparative
research programme would need a common framework for
examining these issues in each independent national context.
In parallel with this study, three of the authors of this study
(JJB and CT as principal investigators; CK as lead researcher)
have developed and deployed a research framework for
comprehensively examining the diverse impacts of multiple
sources of science advice on the activities of the UK Parliament.3
This framework explores not only the work of a legislative science
advice unit, but also maps the broader science advisory
“ecosystem” in which that unit operates. While the details and
results of this ongoing research are beyond the scope of this
study, early results reveal a dynamic science advisory ecosystem
in action (Kenny, 2015), and our emerging understanding from
that study has strongly informed this work. In particular, the
research framework and protocols developed within that project
stimulated questions about other legislative science advisory units
(the focus of this small study), and led us to consider the potential
value of this framework as a foundation for an effective
comparative programme. While not yet rigorously examined,
the core elements of the research framework—based on
embedding researchers within the Parliamentary setting, and
equipping them to deploy a mixed-methods approach that
includes primary document analysis, surveys, semi-structured
interviews and ethnography—provides at minimum a rough
starting-point for further consideration.
Further developing and expanding this research framework to
a large international comparative study would require a notable
investment of researcher effort. Applying this approach would
require embedding researchers with mixed-method social science
expertise into each legislative environment for an extended
period. Ensuring coordination in methodology and case selection
between the researchers examining different legislative environ-
ments would also require regular international research planning
meetings and dissemination of results. However, based on the
institutional diversity and insights identiﬁed by the initial
comparative study presented in this paper, the potential learning
derived from a comprehensive comparative study appears
considerable. Moreover, the substantial and increasing time,
resources and energy being devoted to delivering and enhancing
science advice activities (OECD, 2015: 20) emphasizes the
importance of continuing to expand and improve our global
understanding of contemporary science advisory structures and
practices. Given these factors, we suggest that the learning from
such an international comparative study of legislative science
advice would be well worth the invested time and resources.
Notes
1 The House of Commons Library is made up of eight specialist subject teams. Staff in
the Commons Library are subject specialists. In contrast, staff in the House of Lords
Library are generalists rather than specialists.
2 An example of this playing out can be seen in the 2009 case of Professor David Nutt
being asked by the UK Home Ofﬁce to resign as Chair of its’ Advisory Council on the
Misuse of Drugs because of an article he published “[claiming] that alcohol and
tobacco were more harmful than many illegal drugs, including LSD, ecstasy and
cannabis” (Tran, 2009), which contradicted the Government’s stated policies. While
there are differing accounts of events from Professor Nutt and the Government, the
potential tension created by an executive science adviser directly engaging the public is
clearly evident in this case.
3 Funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and run as a
collaboration between the Parliamentary Ofﬁce of Science and Technology (POST)
and University College London (UCL), this on-going research programme maps and
examines the ways that science advice feeds into legislative processes and how it
interacts with other types and sources of evidence.
References
Attila Z, Barland M, Fixdal J, Fodor K and Kégler Á (2012) Parliamentary TA in
Norway. In: Ganzevles J and van Est R (eds). TA Practice in Europe. Rathenau
Instituut: The Netherlands.
Bimber B and Guston D (1997) Introduction: The end of OTA and the future of
technology assessment. Technological Forecasting and Social Change; 54 (2–3):
125–130.
Bimber B (1996) The Politics of Expertise in Congress. The Rise and Fall of the Ofﬁce
of Technology Assessment. State University of New York Press: Albany, NY.
Blackwood N (2015) Nicola Blackwood MP gives keynote address at Parliamentary
Links Day, http://www.nicolablackwood.com/nicola-gives-keynote-address-at-
parliamentary-links-day/ accessed 18 April 2016.
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2017.30 ARTICLE
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3:17030 |DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2017.30 |www.palgrave-journals.com/palcomms 7
Bütschi D (2012) Knowledge-Based Policy Making. Report of the First Parliamen-
tary TA Debate held in Copenhagen on June 18, 2012. TA-Swiss: Berne,
Germany.
Bütschi D and Almeida M (2015) Technology assessment for parliaments: Towards
reﬂexive governance of innovation. In: Klüver L, Øjvind Nielsen R and
Jørgensen M (eds). Policy-Oriented Technology Assessment Across Europe.
Palgrave: London.
Bütschi D, et al (2004) The practice of TA; Science, interaction and communi-
cation. In: Decker M and Ladikas M (eds). Bridges between Science, Society and
Policy: Technology Assessment—Methods and Impacts. Springer: Berlin,
Germany.
Cruz-Castro L and Sanz-Menédez L (2004) Shaping the impact: The institutional
context of technology assessment. In: Decker M and Ladikas M (eds). Bridges
Between Science, Society and Policy: Technology Assessment—Methods and
Impacts. Springer: Berlin, Germany.
Delvenne P, Fallon C and Brunet S (2011) Parliamentary technology assessment
institutions as indications of reﬂexive modernization. Technology in Society; 33
(1–2): 36–43.
Doubleday R and Wilsdon J (eds) (2013) Future Directions for Scientiﬁc Advice in
Whitehall. University of Cambridge’s Centre for Science and Policy; Science
Policy Research Unit (SPRU) and ESRC STEPS Centre at the University of
Sussex; Alliance for Useful Evidence; Institute for Government; Sciencewise-
ERC: London.
Douglas H (2009) Science, Policy and the Value-Free Ideal. University of Pittsburgh
Press: Pittsburgh, PA.
Enzing C, Deuten J, Rijnders-Nagle M and van Til J (2012) Technology Across
Borders—Exploring Perspectives for Pan-European Parliamentary Technology
Assessment. European Parliament, STOA: Brussels, UK.
European Parliamentary Research Service. (2015) Scientiﬁc advice for policymakers
in the European Union. PE 559.512.
European Parliamentary Technology Assessment. (2012) EPTA Booklet: parlia-
mentary technology assessment in Europe—an overview of 17 institutions and
how they work, http://www.oeaw.ac.at/ita/ﬁleadmin/epta/epta-booklet.pdf.
Feresin E, Leichteris E, Rüegsegger A and Bütschi D (2012) Parliamentary TA in
Switzerland. In: Ganzevles J and van Est R (eds). TA Practice in Europe.
Rathenau Instituut: The Netherlands.
Gallagher J (2015) MPs say yes to three-person babies. [BBC 3 February 2015],
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-31069173, accessed 18 April 2016.
Genus A (2006) Rethinking constructive technology assessment as democratic,
reﬂective, discourse. Technological Forecasting and Social Change; 73 (1):
13–26.
Gibbons J and Gwin H (1985) Technology and governance. Technology in Society;
7 (4): 333–352.
Glynn S, Cunningham P and Flanagan K (2003) Typifying scientiﬁc advisory
structures and scientiﬁc advice production methodologies (TSAS). Final report
prepared for Directorate-General Research, European Commission. PREST,
University of Manchester ISBN 0 946007 18 7.
Guston D (2004) Forget politicizing science. Let’s democratize science! Perspectives:
Issues in science and technology; 21 (1): 25–28.
Guston D, Jones M and Branscomb L (1997) Technology assessment in the U.S.
state legislatures. Technological Forecasting and Social Change; 54 (2–3):
233–250.
Hennen L (2000) Impacts of participatory TA on its societal environment. In: Vig
N and Paschen H (eds). Parliaments and Technology. The Development of
Technology Assessment in Europe. State University of New York Press: New
York.
Hennen L (2012) Parliamentary technology assessment in Europe and the role of
public participation. In: O’Doherty K and Einsiedel E (eds). Public Engagement
and Emerging Technologies. UBC Press: Toronto, Canada.
Hennen L and Ladikas M (2009) Embedding society in European science and
technology policy advice. In: Ladikas M (ed) Embedding Society in science and
Technology Policy—European and Chinese Perspectives. European Commission:
Brussels, UK.
Hennen L et al (2004) Towards a framework for assessing the impact of technology
assessment. In: Decker M and Ladikas M (eds). Bridges Between Science, Society
and Policy. Technology Assessment—Methods and Impacts. Springer: Berlin,
Germany.
Hennen L and Nierling L (eds) (2015a) Taking stock of TA in Europe and abroad.
In: TA as an Institutionalized Practice: Recent National Developments and
Challenges. European Union: Brussels, UK.
Hennen L and Nierling L (2015b) A Next Wave of Technology Assessment?
Barriers and Opportunities for Establishing TA in Seven European Countries.
Science and Public Policy; 42 (1): 44–58.
Hofer M, Jakobsson C, Zaﬁropoulos N, Vamvakas S, Vetter T, Regnstrom J
and Hemmings R (2015) Regulatory watch: Impact of scientiﬁc advice
from the European Medicines Agency. Nature Reviews Drug Discovery; 14 (5):
302–303.
House of Commons. (1995) The Parliamentary Ofﬁce of Science and Technology:
First Report of the Information Committee Session 1994-5, HC578. HMSO:
London.
House of Lords Science and Technology Committee. (2012) The role and functions
of Departmental Chief Scientiﬁc Advisers. HL264.
Jones M, Guston D and Branscomb L (1996) Informed Legislatures. Coping with
Science in a Democracy. University Press of America: Boston, MA.
Kenny C (2015) The impact of academia on Parliament. LSE Impact of Social
Sciences [blog], http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2015/10/19/the-
impact-of-uk-academia-on-parliament/, accessed 17 March 2016.
Lake G (1995) Utilisation of scientiﬁc and technical expertise in a European policy
context. Science & Public Policy; 22 (3): 162–168.
Lentsch J and Weingart P (eds) (2011) Introduction: the quest for quality as a
challenge to scientiﬁc policy advice: an overdue debate?. In: The Politics of
Scientiﬁc Advice: Institutional Design for Quality Assurance. Cambridge
University Press: Cambridge, UK.
Morgan M and Peha J (eds) (2003) Science and Technology Advice for Congress.
Resources for the Future Press: Washington DC.
Nath C (2011) Use of Scientiﬁc and Technological Evidence within the Parliament of
Uganda. Parliamentary Ofﬁce of Science and Technology, London, UK.
Nentwich M, Peissl W and Sotoudeh M (2012) Parliamentary TA in Austria. In:
Ganzevles J and van Est R (eds). TA Practice in Europe. Rathenau Instituut: The
Netherlands.
Norton M (1997) The UK Parliamentary Ofﬁce of Science and technology and its
interaction with the OTA. Technological Forecasting and Social Change; 54 (2):
215–231.
Nowotny H, Scott P and Gibbons M (2001) Re-Thinking science. Knowledge and
the Public in an Age of Uncertainty. Polity Press: Cambridge, UK.
OECD. (2015) Scientiﬁc Advice for Policy Making: The role and Responsibility of
Scientists. OECD: Paris, France.
Padilla A and Gibson I (2000) Science moves to centre stage. Nature; 403 (6768):
357–359.
Paldam Folker M, Klüver L, Jacobi A and Almeida M (2012) Parliamentary TA in
Denmark. In: Ganzevles J and van Est R (eds). TA Practice in Europe. Rathenau
Instituut: The Netherlands.
Pielke R (2003) The Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science in Policy and Politics.
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, UK.
Rip A (2012) Futures of Technology Assessment. In: Decker M, Grunwald A and
Knapp M (eds). Der Systemblick auf Innovation. Technikfolgenabschätzung in
der Technikgestaltung. Edition Sigma: Berlin, Germany, pp 29–39.
Salo A and Kuusi O (2001) Developments in parliamentary technology assessment
in Finland. Science and Public Policy; 28 (6): 453–464.
Schot J and Rip A (1997) The past and future of constructive technology
assessment. Technological Forecasting and Social Change; 54 (2–3): 251–268.
Simon F (2014) EU twisting facts to ﬁt political agenda, chief scientists says.
EurActiv, 27 May, http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-priorities-2020/eu-
twisting-facts-ﬁt-political-agenda-chief-scientist-says-302399 accessed 30
November 2015.
Spruijt P, Knol A, Vasileiadou E, Devilee J, Lebret E and Petersen A (2014) Roles of
scientists as policy advisers on complex issues: A literature review. Environ-
mental Science & Policy; 40 (June 2014): 16–25.
Tran M (2009) Government drug adviser David Nutt sacked. The Guardian,
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/oct/30/drugs-adviser-david-nutt-
sacked, accessed 8 February 2017.
Tyler C (2013) Scientiﬁc advice in Parliament. In: Doubleday R and Wilsdon J
(eds). Future Directions for Scientiﬁc Advice in Whitehall. University of
Cambridge’s Centre for Science and Policy; Science Policy Research Unit
(SPRU) and ESRC STEPS Centre at the University of Sussex; Alliance for Useful
Evidence; Institute for Government; Sciencewise-ERC: London.
Van Est R, Ganzevles J and Nentwich M (2015) Modeling parliamentary
technnnology assessment in relational terms. In: Hennen L and Nierling L
(eds). TA as an Institutionalized Practice. Recent National Developments and
Challenges. European Union: Brussels, UK.
Vig N and Paschen H (eds) (2000) Parliaments and Technology: The Development
of Technology Assessment in Europe. The State University of New York Press:
Albany, NY.
Wilsdon J, Allen K and Paulavets K (2014) Science advice to Governments: Diverse
systems, commons challenges. A brieﬁng paper for the Auckland conference,
28–29 August 2014, http://www.globalscienceadvice.org/wp-content/uploads/
2014/08/Science_Advice_to_Governments_Brieﬁng_Paper_25-August.pdf
accessed 12 November 2015.
Data availability
Data sharing not applicable to this article as no data sets were generated or analysed
during the current study.
ARTICLE PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2017.30
8 PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3:17030 |DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2017.30 |www.palgrave-journals.com/palcomms
Author Contributions
These authors contributed equally to this work:
Caroline Kenny and Carla-Leanne Washbourne
These authors jointly supervised this work:
Chris Tyler and Jason Blackstock
Corresponding author: Jason Blackstock
Correspondence to: jason.blackstock@ucl.ac.uk
Additional information
Competing interests: The authors declare that they have no competing ﬁnancial
interests.
Reprints and permission information is available at http://www.palgrave-journals.com/
pal/authors/rights_and_permissions.html
How to cite this article: Kenny C, Washbourne C-L, Tyler C and Blackstock JJ (2017)
Legislative Science advice in Europe: the case for international comparative research.
Palgrave Communications. 3:17030 doi: 10.1057/palcomms.2017.30.
Publisher’s note: Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in
published maps and institutional afﬁliations.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License. The images or other third party material in this
article are included in the article’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise
in the credit line; if the material is not included under the Creative Commons license,
users will need to obtain permission from the license holder to reproduce the material.
To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
r The Author(s) 2017
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2017.30 ARTICLE
PALGRAVE COMMUNICATIONS | 3:17030 |DOI: 10.1057/palcomms.2017.30 |www.palgrave-journals.com/palcomms 9
